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1
INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE
With the written consent of the Petitioners and
the Respondents, Amici respectfully submit this brief
as amici curiae.1
Amici are professors who study law and religion.
We are aware that defamation occurs both inside and
outside religious organizations. We ask this Court to
allow this religious defamation lawsuit to proceed because the Lippards’ reputations were damaged by a
non-religious harmful act not protected by religious
freedom. We ask the Court not to allow absolute protection to religious people who harm the reputations of
their colleagues.
Amici include:
Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean and Jesse H.
Choper Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law
Marci Hamilton, Senior Resident Fellow in
the Program for Research on Religion, University of Pennsylvania
Rodney A. Smolla, Dean and Professor of Law,
Delaware Law School, Widener University

1

Counsel for amici curiae authored this brief in whole and
no other person or entity other than amici or their counsel has
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief. Petitioners and Respondents were timely notiﬁed
and granted consent to ﬁle.

2
Mark Strasser, Trustees Professor of Law,
Capital University Law School, Columbus,
Ohio
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The nation’s courts are in profound disagreement
about the law of defamation in religious organizations.
We ask the Court to grant certiorari in this case so that
Barry Lippard can sue for the defamatory comment
that he had “blocked [Hix’s] exit from the music room
and was aggressively going after [Hix], pointing his
ﬁnger in [Hix]’s face.” Kim LIPPARD and Barry Lippard, Petitioners v. Larry HOLLEMAN and Alan Hix,
Respondents, 2021 WL 763758 (U.S.), 6. We ask the
Court to grant certiorari in this case so that Kim Lippard can show that being charged with “slandering
comments about a fellow choir member, and that she
had accused Hix of lying and hiding sheet music,” was
defamatory. Id. These are factual disputes that can be
resolved through defamation law, without any attention to religious teaching or any infringement of religious liberty.
Some states judge the lawsuits according to “neutral principles of law.” Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist
Church, 406 S.C. 156, 160, 750 S.E.2d 605, 607 (2013).
Others back a “categorical rule of law, closely akin to
an absolute privilege to defame, thereby denying a
state court remedy for a state tort. The court virtually
inoculates speakers from liability for even their most
outrageous false, malicious, and damaging statements
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that may have only a remote connection to any religious doctrine or mission.” Pfeil v. St. Matthews
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered Augsburg
Confession of Worthington, 877 N.W.2d 528, 545 (Minn.
2016) (Lillehaug dissent) (emphasis added).
A different court determined that the “spirit of Satan” had a secular as well as a religious meaning, and
therefore a defamation claim could be brought against
religious defendants without using arguments about
religion. Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conf. of United Methodist
Church, 663 N.W.2d 404, 407–08 (Iowa 2003). In contrast, some cases are dismissed under the ministerial
exception. See Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Baptist Church
of Pittsburg, No. CV 15-1599, 2017 WL 3608140, at *34
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2017), aff ’d sub nom. Lee v. Sixth
Mount Zion Baptist Church of Pittsburgh, 903 F.3d 113
(3d Cir. 2018) (“Pennsylvania courts have clearly held
that the ministerial exception applies to contract and
defamation claims.”); Connor v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 601 Pa. 577, 622–23, 975 A.2d 1084, 1111–12
(2009) (“in many of the ministerial exception cases involving defamation claims, the courts explicitly note
that jurisdiction cannot be exercised even though the
allegedly defamatory statements themselves may have
been of a secular nature.”); Yaggie v. Ind.-Ky. Synod
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., 860 F. Supp.
1194, 1198 (W.D. Ky. 1994) (A defamation case involving employment of a minister could not be brought).
Some cases are dismissed because the involved
parties are priests or because the events took place
in a church’s disciplinary setting. Downs v. Roman
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Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683 A.2d 808 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Unaltered Augsburg Confession of
Worthington, 877 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2016).
In many of these lawsuits, “a defamation claim
based on a man making similar statements from a
soapbox on the street corner would be within the
court’s jurisdiction.” Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist
Church, 406 S.C. 156, 162, 750 S.E.2d 605, 608 (2013).
We ask this Court to clarify in this case that defamation is illegal both in the pulpit and on the soapbox. We
ask you to grant certiorari and allow the Lippards’ lawsuit to proceed under the defamation laws of North
Carolina.
In North Carolina, “[i]n order to recover for defamation, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the
defendant made false, defamatory statements of or
concerning the plaintiff, which were published to a
third person, causing injury to the plaintiff ’s reputation.” Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 211 N.C. App. 469,
478, 710 S.E.2d 309, 317 (2011), citing Tyson v. L’eggs
Products, Inc., 84 N.C.App. 1, 10–11, 351 S.E.2d 834,
840 (1987). The Lippards can prove those elements
without any interference with anyone’s religious freedom.
Indeed, it would violate religious freedom to give
religious people complete freedom to defame others
without ever paying a penalty. Religious organizations
would therefore become lawless institutions that do
great harm to their members. We ask this Court to
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state that the First Amendment does not give constitutional or statutory protection to defamation. Under
Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, the
defamation laws are neutral laws of general applicability that apply to everyone. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), the
government has a “compelling interest” in eradicating defamation; it would “commit one of ‘the gravest
abuses’ of its responsibilities” if it did not make clear
to the country that falsely harming people’s reputations is illegal for everyone. Little Sisters of the Poor
Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367, 2392 (2020).
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

Defamation Cases Should Be Decided by
the Courts Under Neutral Principles of
Law.

Which of the following statements is defamatory?
The courts are all over the place about such statements, disagreeing about what defamation law protects whenever religion is involved, even when the
statement is not religious and is not protected by religious freedom.
A “priest and nun spread a rumor about the local
Catholic school’s elementary principal, implying to
multiple people that she ‘was having a sexual affair
with Father Ed Doyle.’ ” Gaydos v. Blauer, 81 S.W.3d
186 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002), cited in Alexander J. Lindvall,
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Forgive Me, Your Honor, for I Have Sinned: Limiting
the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine to Allow Suits
for Defamation and Negligent Employment Practices,
72 S.C. L. REV. 25, 43–44 (2020).
The “Trustees had placed a mortgage upon the
Church’s property in order to purchase apartment
buildings nearby. . . . the Trustees failed to insure the
apartment buildings and that funds were missing because of their mismanagement. Finally, he stated the
Trustees had constantly deceived him.” Banks v. St.
Matthew Baptist Church, 406 S.C. 156, 158–59, 750
S.E.2d 605, 606 (2013).
The priest was living with a woman he was not
married to. Moreover, he had posted sexually descriptive items on Facebook. Warnick v. All Saints Episcopal Church, No. 01539 DEC.TERM 2011, 2014 WL
11210513, at *7–8 (Pa. Com. Pl. Apr. 15, 2014), aff ’d,
116 A.3d 684 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014), for text, see No. 714
EDA 2014, 2014 WL 10753746 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 11,
2014).
The “Pfeils had ‘accused [him] of stealing money
from’ St. Matthew Lutheran Church. The Pfeils allege
that they made no such accusation. In other words,
they contend that the minister falsely accused them of
making a false accusation of the crime of theft.” Pfeil v.
St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered Augsburg Confession of Worthington, 877 N.W.2d
528, 546 (Minn. 2016) (Lillehaug dissent).
“Folks, when is enough, enough? When will you
stop the blaming, negative and unhappy persons
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among you from tearing down the spirit of Jesus Christ
among you? . . . You know whether a person has the
spirit of Jesus or Satan by their fruits. . . . I am distressed and perplexed why people have tolerance and
compassion for anyone who habitually tears down the
Body of Christ by habitually sowing discord and pain.”
Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conf. of United Methodist Church,
663 N.W.2d 404, 405 (Iowa 2003).
“McRaney alleges that NAMB [North American
Mission Board] intentionally made false statements
about him to BCMD [Baptist Convention for Maryland/Delaware] that resulted in his termination. Speciﬁcally, he alleges that NAMB falsely told BCMD that
he refused to meet with Dr. Kevin Ezell, president of
NAMB, to discuss a new SPA [strategic partnership
agreement]. He also alleges that NAMB intentionally
got him uninvited to speak at the mission symposium
and posted his picture at its headquarters to ‘communicate that [McRaney] was not to be trusted and
[was] public enemy #1 of NAMB.’ ” McRaney v. N. Am.
Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 966 F.3d
346, 349 (5th Cir. 2020).
“Marshall’s complaint alleges Munro maliciously
made false statements that Marshall was divorced,
was dishonest, was unable to perform pastoral duties
due to throat surgery, and had made an improper advance to a member of the Anchorage congregation.”
Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424, 425 (Alaska 1993).
“[P]erson X murdered their spouse” or “person X is
a child molester.” Alexander J. Lindvall, Forgive Me,
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Your Honor, for I Have Sinned: Limiting the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine to Allow Suits for Defamation
and Negligent Employment Practices, 72 S.C. L. REV.
25, 43–44 (2020).
“Suppose there was a radical sect of Christianity
in the United States that took the Bible’s verses on
stoning literally. If the congregants stoned a man for
‘gathering wood on the sabbath day,’ could the stonee
sue for battery?” Id. at 50.
The “priest accused the seminarian of ‘sexually
motivated [mis]conduct.’ ” Downs v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Baltimore, 683 A.2d 808 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1996).
“Joe violated God’s Fourth Commandment.” Lindvall,
supra, at 51–52.
“Father Jones stole $5,000 from the church and
should be removed from the priesthood.” Id.
“Father Jones is untrustworthy and should be removed from the priesthood.” Id.
The “Synod placed a document in Drevlow’s ﬁle
stating that his spouse had previously been married.
This accusation was untrue.” Drevlow never got a job
because this was in his ﬁle. Drevlow v. Lutheran
Church, Missouri Synod, 991 F.2d 468, 469–70 (8th Cir.
1993).
The “minister assaulted a member of the church.”
Kim LIPPARD and Barry Lippard, Petitioners v. Larry
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HOLLEMAN and Alan Hix, Respondents, 2021 WL
763758 (U.S.), 2.
“Mr. Lippard had ‘blocked [Hix’s] exit from the music room and was aggressively going after [Hix], pointing his ﬁnger in [Hix]’s face.’ ” Id. at 6.
The courts have conﬂicting results on these statements; some states ban defamation lawsuits when
religions are involved. The tort law of defamation, however, is neutral enough to handle these situations without any violation of religious liberty. Like other states,
in North Carolina, “[i]n order to recover for defamation, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant made false, defamatory statements of or
concerning the plaintiff, which were published to a
third person, causing injury to the plaintiff ’s reputation.” Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 211 N.C. App. 469,
478, 710 S.E.2d 309, 317 (2011), citing Tyson v. L’eggs
Products, Inc., 84 N.C.App. 1, 10–11, 351 S.E.2d 834,
840 (1987).
These elements could be applied in all these cases.
In Warnick, for example, the court dismissed the case
for religious reasons, even though there was no defamation case because it was true that the plaintiff was
living with another woman and had posted sexually
explicit items on Facebook. Warnick, supra, at *31.
True statements are not defamatory. Id. at *32. In
Drevlow, by contrast, the statements about the man’s
wife being divorced were untrue and defamatory.
Drevlow, supra, at *471. Whether a person had stolen
$5,000, Lindvall, supra, or physically attacked another
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person, Lippard, supra, are factual situations that
can be decided to be true or false in the courtroom.
Whether someone is divorced, had throat surgery, or
failed to insure apartment buildings, are basic facts
that can be handled by the defamation laws.
Mr. Lindvall asks above, “If the congregants
stoned a man for ‘gathering wood on the sabbath day,’
could the stonee sue for battery?” Lindvall, supra, at
50. We hope so. We also hope that all those defamed by
their religious friends will be able to sue for the harm
caused by defamation.
Letting the courts decide who wins or loses is better than letting defamers have complete freedom to injure everyone’s reputation. “Our thesis is that the
Constitution meant to and should be interpreted as
creating a secular republic, meaning that the government has no role in advancing religion and that religious belief and practice should be a private matter,
one where people should not be able to inﬂict injury on
others in the name of religion.” HOWARD GILLMAN AND
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE RELIGION CLAUSES: THE CASE
FOR SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE 18 (2020). Defamation is such an injury that should not be inﬂicted in the
name of religion. The Lippards should be able to sue
against such injury in court.
II.

The Free Exercise Clause Allows Such
Lawsuits.

Courts may determine the factual claims in a defamation lawsuit, even when the alleged culprit made
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the potentially false statements in a religious setting.
That rule is consistent with this Court’s free exercise
law. Smith reﬂects this Court’s important tradition of
asking religious people to obey neutral laws that govern everyone. Smith reiterated this Court’s longstanding view that “religious believers are subject to the
law.” See Marci A. Hamilton, Employment Division v.
Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, the Litigants, and the Doctrinal Discourse, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
1671, 1674–75 (2011); Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res.
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). “This approach was
employed . . . to uphold the anti-polygamy laws, the social security laws, military conscription laws, Sunday
closing laws, social security identiﬁcation requirements, federal oversight of federal lands, prison regulations, and state taxation of products sold by a
religious organization.” Id. (footnotes omitted). This
Court has repeatedly held that religion must not undo
laws that protect everyone’s health and safety. See, e.g.,
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879; United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). As this
Court stated in Smith:
We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct
that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our
free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that
proposition.
494 U.S. at 878–79.
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This Court has been clear that religious employers
do not enjoy an exemption from the Social Security
laws of the United States. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 258–61
(identifying the dangers of giving religious exemptions
to the tax laws). “The tax system could not function if
denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner
that violates their religious belief.” Id. at 260; see also
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (rejecting
free exercise challenge to income taxes). Indeed, in
Smith, this Court reiterated the free exercise point:
“Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the
proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition
relieves an objector from any colliding duty ﬁxed by a
democratic government.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 402 U.S. 437, 461 (1971)).
This Court accepts that a “private right to ignore
generally applicable laws is a constitutional anomaly.”
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886. There are many situations
where the Court had ruled it important for everyone to
obey neutral laws. As this Court stated about rejecting
the religious exemption rule in Smith:
The rule respondents favor would open the
prospect of constitutionally required religious
exemptions from civic obligations of almost
every conceivable kind-ranging from compulsory military service, see, e.g., Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), to the payment of taxes, see, e.g., United States v. Lee,
supra; to health and safety regulation such as
manslaughter and child neglect laws, see, e.g.,
Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Crim.
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App. 1988), compulsory vaccination laws, see,
e.g., Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d
816 (1964), drug laws, see, e.g., Olsen v. Drug
Enforcement Administration, 279 U.S. App.
D.C. 1, 878 F.2d 1458 (1989), and trafﬁc laws,
see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61
S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941); to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws,
see Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953,
85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985), child labor laws, see
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct.
438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944),. . . . and laws providing for equality of opportunity for the races,
see, Bob Jones University v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 603–04, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2034–35, 76
L.Ed.2d 157 (1983).
Id. at 888–89. As this Court concluded about all those
cases, “The First Amendment’s protection of religious
liberty does not require this.” Id. at 889 (emphasis
added).
Instead, this Court has accepted the idea that applies to this case: “Simply stated, when conduct jeopardizes human health and safety, government cannot
deregulate for religion without sacriﬁcing its health
and safety interests in the regulation.” Hamilton, supra, at 1687 (footnotes omitted).
If this Court prefers to apply Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) to this case, the result is the same.
The government has a “compelling interest” in eradicating illegal defamation that harms people’s reputations. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter &
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Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2392
(2020) (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that “ ‘[o]nly
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest’
could ‘give occasion for [a] permissible limitation’ on
the free exercise of religion.”) (alteration in original)
(quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406); Bostock v. Clayton
Cty., Ga., 590 U.S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 32) (asserting that the “federal government [is prohibited]
from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of
religion unless it demonstrates that doing so both
furthers a compelling governmental interest and represents the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest”).
Free exercise should never protect a right to defame.
III. The Ministerial Exception Does Not Bar
This Lawsuit.
Mr. Lippard was a church member, but not a minister, so the ministerial exception does not bar his
claims. As a pianist, Mrs. Lippard may be viewed as a
minister in some courts. See, e.g., Cannata v. Cath. Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 170 (5th Cir. 2012)
(church pianist is a minister). The courts have given
great protection to the ministerial exception in order
to protect religious freedom. However, the ministerial exception “does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a general immunity from secular laws[.]”
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140
S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020). This Court explained in
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Hosanna-Tabor that churches are not absolutely free
to abuse their ministers. “We express no view on
whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or
tortious conduct by their religious employers. There
will be time enough to address the applicability of the
exception to other circumstances if and when they
arise.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012).
The circumstances have arisen. The time has come
for the Court to state that defamation cases should be
won or lost on the facts, in court.
Protecting all churches from being subject to defamation law is reminiscent of the churches’ early claims
“that the First Amendment shields them from civil
lawsuits for negligent supervision and retention of employees who sexually abuse children.” Editorial, Clerical Abusers and the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
14, 2012. We now are certain that religious wrongdoers
who abuse others should be punished by the courts. As
the courts now allow child abusers to be held liable for
their misconduct, so too should they allow the courts to
decide the defamation cases based on the facts, and not
on religious status.
Now is the time for this Court to make clear, and
to reiterate, that the First Amendment does not protect
individuals from all defamation suits.
The First Amendment usually blocks individuals
from suing their churches “over matters of signiﬁcant
religious concern.” Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise
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Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor,
108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1203 (2014). The courts
learned from the child abuse cases that such abuse is
not a matter of religious concern. No one in these cases
is claiming that defamation is a religious duty that
they must undertake. Instead, it is illegal conduct,
which should be barred for everyone.
This is why “the regular tort rules apply to someone hit by the church bus or by a falling gargoyle.
Those suits threaten no religious practice.” Lund, supra, at 1204. This case is as bad as being hit by a
church bus or by a falling gargoyle; it involves the defamatory charge that “Mr. Lippard had ‘blocked [Hix’s]
exit from the music room and was aggressively going
after [Hix], pointing his finger in [Hix]’s face.’ ” Lippard,
supra, at 6. Mr. Lippard could get into legal trouble if
he had engaged in such terrible conduct. More important for the ministerial exception, pianist Mrs.
Lippard was accused of making “slandering comments
about a fellow choir member, and that she had accused
Hix of lying and hiding sheet music.” Id. at 6. These are
factual disputes that can be resolved without any attention to religious teaching and without any infringement of religious liberty.
While this case does not involve child abuse, this
Court should clarify that religious freedom does not
provide religious organizations freedom from neutral,
generally applicable laws like defamation. As in the
sex abuse cases, such decisions have no relation to ministry, the only title expressly protected. Consequently,
it is of vital importance that this Court clarify the law,
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thereby encouraging others to come forward and discontinue their silence about defamation for fear of dismissal of their cases by hesitant courts.
This Court has long stated that religious actors
are required to obey neutral laws because the rule of
law protects everyone. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 604 (1979); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res.
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This Court
should clarify that the neutral principles of law apply
to this case. Consistent with this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, state and federal courts have abstained from hearing cases only when the dispute
cannot be resolved according to neutral principles of
law. See, e.g., Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary,
426 S.W.3d 597, 618 (Ky. 2014) (“Secular courts may,
however, have jurisdiction over a case involving a
church if ‘neutral principles of law’ can be applied in
reaching the resolution.”).
For this reason, courts allow lawsuits against a
Christian seminary to proceed because the litigation
can be resolved according to neutral, non-religious
principles of law, just like the defamation case here. Id.
at 615. See also Galetti v. Reeve, 331 P.3d 997, 1001
(N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (when tort and contract claims
can be “ ‘resolved by the application of purely neutral
principles of law and without impermissible government intrusion . . . there is no First Amendment shield
to litigation’ ”) (quoting McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d
840, 852 (N.J. 2002) (emphasis, internal quotation
marks, and citations omitted)).
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“The First Amendment stands as a bulwark
against ofﬁcial religious prejudice and embodies our
Nation’s deep commitment to religious plurality and
tolerance. That constitutional promise is why, ‘[f ]or
centuries now, people have come to this country from
every corner of the world to share in the blessing of
religious freedom.’ ” Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392,
2446–47, 201 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S., at
___, 134 S. Ct., at 1841 (Kagan, J., dissenting)).
As part of our blessing of religious freedom, the
Free Exercise Clause reserves the right of American
citizens to accept any religious belief, but limits their
rights to action. Smith, 449 U.S. at 877. It does not allow religious employers to change their actions when
they get to court if it keeps the case non-justiciable. In
other words, although the freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom to act, whether religiously motivated
or otherwise, is not.
“At some point, accommodation [of religious freedom] may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion’ and violate the Establishment Clause.” Corp. of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla.,
480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)). That point is reached here,
where the Petitioners lost their right to win or lose a
defamation suit in court. Like the Connecticut statute
that unconstitutionally “arm[ed] Sabbath observers
with an absolute and unqualiﬁed right not to work on
whatever day they designate as their Sabbath,” the
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ban on defamation suits in this case violates the Establishment Clause through its “unyielding weighting
in favor of [religious organizations] over all other interests,” especially the interests of church members in
keeping their reputations from nasty harm by their fellow church members. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,
472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005). The point of unlawful fostering of religion is reached with the government’s complete exemption from defamation laws.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
“Courts must stop pretending that the Constitution requires affording immunity to public humiliation
and character assassination – providing such immunity does not promote the interests of religious institutions, their members, or the public at large.” Mark P.
Strasser, A Constitutional Balancing in Need of Adjustment: On Defamation, Breaches of Conﬁdentiality, and
the Church, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 325, 383–84
(2013).
Religious freedom does not give individuals a right
to disobey the laws that govern everyone. See, e.g.,
Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990). This is the important and sustainable
lesson of Smith. Everyone, even religious people, must
obey neutral laws of general applicability. Id. at 879.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (“[T]he right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
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comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ”) (quoting another source); see also Christian
Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll.
of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 694 n.24 (2010)
(observing that, under Smith, the Free Exercise Clause
did not require public law school to grant religious exemption to its “all-comers” policy forbidding discrimination by student organizations).
Defamation is not a permissible choice for religious actors. The law should not be changed to legalize
defamation, as Respondents request in this case. We
ask the Court to grant certiorari and open the defamation lawsuits to all sustainable cases. Plaintiffs ask
this Court to remember that everyone, religious and
non-religious, must obey “neutral laws of general applicability.” Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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